BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Date iCal//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.2//
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Eventi DIAG
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Paris
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20231029T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20230326T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:CEST
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.25716.field_data.0@www.u-gov-ricerca.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260405T115715Z
CREATED:20230606T094608Z
DESCRIPTION:In the classical marriage model by Gale and Shapley\, agents fr
 om one side of the market have a strict ordering of the agents from the ot
 her side of the market and vice-versa. The goal is to find a matching that
  satisfies a fairness condition known as stability. However\, strict order
 s cannot model many preference patterns that arise in problems such as div
 ersification of school cohorts\, formation of teams\, etc. Hence\, much at
 tention has recently been reserved to matching problems where preferences 
 of agents have a more complex behavior\, which can be described via certai
 n choice functions. In the first part of this talk\, I will investigate al
 gorithmic properties of these models\, showing that the classical combinat
 orial approach based on the distributive lattice of stable matchings and t
 he description of the convex hull of stable matchings as an LP are intimat
 ely related. This approach may turn out to be of interest for other proble
 ms as well. In the second part of the talk\, I will show how certain choic
 e functions can be used to model school admission criteria that take into 
 account well-defined diversity and fairness concerns. I will show the prac
 tical relevance of those choice functions by applying them to data from sp
 ecialized high schools admission in New York City. Based on joint work wit
 h Swati Gupta (GA Tech & MIT) and Xuan Zhang (Meta Research). Bio: Yuri Fa
 enza obtained his Ph.D. from the Sapienza University of Rome and is curren
 tly an associate professor in the IEOR department at Columbia University. 
 He works in discrete optimization\, operations research\, matching theory\
 , market design\, and their applications. His research has been funded by 
 the NSF (including an NSF Career award)\, the ONR\, the Swiss NSF\, and by
  a Meta Research Award. He is the current chair of Mixed-Integer Programmi
 ng Society of the MOS.   
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230616T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230616T140000
LAST-MODIFIED:20230606T100626Z
LOCATION:Aula Magna DIAG
SUMMARY:Stable matchings in choice function models: algorithms\, polyhedra\
 , and an application to school choice - Yuri Faenza
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.u-gov-ricerca.uniroma1.it/node/25716
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR