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DTSTART:20151025T030000
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UID:calendar.7158.field_data.0@www.u-gov-ricerca.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260411T130922Z
CREATED:20151029T175536Z
DESCRIPTION:In this talk I will give an introduction to sequential posted p
 rice mechanims (SPPMs)\, and cover some of my own work in this area as wel
 l. SPPMs are a type of auction in which there is a single good for sale\, 
 and the auctioneer iteratively offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each 
 of the participants of the auction at which a buyer can buy an item. The c
 omputer science and economics literature on this subject is mostly concern
 ed with the revenue and social welfare that sequential posted price auctio
 ns are able to generate.In the first part of the talk\, I will give an ove
 rview of the existing literature on SPPMs and I will discuss why it is imp
 ortant to study SPPMs and how they are positioned into the general mechani
 sm design and auction theory research fields. In the second part\, I will 
 talk about some recent papers I have co-authored on this subject:In the fi
 rst paper we analyze SPPMs\, extended to a setting where the bidders' valu
 ations are correlated with each other. Joint work with M. Adamczyk\, A. Bo
 rodin\, D. Ferraioli\, and S. Leonardi.The second paper introduces SPPMs f
 or two-sided markets (i.e.\, with multiple buyers and sellers) in order to
  obtain O(1)-approximations to the expected optimal social welfare of the 
 market. Joint work with R. Colini-Baldeschi\, S. Leonardi\, and S. Turchet
 ta.Bio: Bart de Keijzer is a postdoctoral researcher at Sapienza Universit
 y of Rome. He obtained his Ph.D. from CWI/VU University in 2014. His resea
 rch interests are in algorithms and computational complexity\, and its app
 lication to economics.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20151106T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20151106T140000
LAST-MODIFIED:20151105T152602Z
LOCATION:Aula Magna\, Via Ariosto 25
SUMMARY:Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms - Bart de Keijzer
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.u-gov-ricerca.uniroma1.it/node/7158
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